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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant i _ L tah I ode \nn. § 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1953, as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
•. Whether IN loon w as properly terminated from, his posit ion wi th the U tah Depar tmen t 
of Natural Resources (hereinafter the "Department"), including the following issues: 
1. Whether Moon's participation in a single wildlife incident was sufficient to 
merit Moon's termination from • i ill IHIIL ( .iiai Sun \ m r R r in w 
Board rnonnmsh ml.'iprrlnl *»r " I M el ntes to the termination of a state 
employee. This involves a determination as to whether the Department correctly applied 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes when it upheld Moon's termination. In making this 
determination, the Court should apply a correctio. i a.iuaiu. 
IJii^ m:iitr t,«- i . i Sr Rcvicw Board's Decision and Final 
Agency Action entered on February 9, 1998. R., l jJ-155. The issues were preserved for 
appeal by the filing of a Petition for Writ of Review on March 10, 1998. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Besides Utah case law on point, other determinative rules include Utah Administrative 
Code, R 137-1-20(1) and R 477-i l-l(3)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
was employed by the State of Utah for over 15 years, and who has dedicated his career to the 
1 
State of Utah, can be dismissed for a single misdemeanor wildlife violation. Under previous 
case law, Utah regulations, and basic concepts of fairness, the answer to this question must 
be "no". 
Randy Moon (hereinafter "Moon") has been employed with the Department since 
1993, and by the state of Utah as a Science Advisor to the governor since 1982. In that time, 
Moon was a well-respected state employee, with a work record free from any write-ups or 
disciplinary measures. R., 824-833. On December 7, 1996, Moon went with his sons, Ryan 
and Nathan, on a hunting expedition into northern Utah. Only Nathan had a license to hunt 
antelope; Moon merely accompanied him, and did not carry a gun. During this trip, Moon 
watched as his son Nathan shot an antelope. Unfortunately, it turned out that Nathan was 
actually inside the border of Wyoming at the time he shot the antelope. When later 
confronted with this fact by a Wyoming officer, Moon was issued a citation for "aiding and 
assisting" his son in the unlawful taking of an antelope out of season. Nathan was cited for 
the taking of the antelope. Moon did not challenge the misdemeanor citation issued, 
cooperated fully with the authorities, and paid a fine. Nathan, who was 19 at the time, was 
immediately terminated by the Department for his actions. R., 144-146, 859-879, 880-893, 
962-963. 
Moon was not terminated at the time this incident occurred. Instead, Moon was 
suspended, pending an investigation into his past work record. After an extensive 
investigation, the Department alleged that Moon had engaged in an "abuse of position" in 
October, 1996. The Department then terminated Moon on February 11, 1997 for both the 
2 
wildlife violation and this new charge. Moon appealed his termination to the Career Service 
Review Board (hereinafter "CSRB"). After a Step 5 evidentiary hearing, a CSRB hearing 
officer upheld Moon's termination. Moon then appealed the decision to the CSRB for a 6th 
level review. R., 34-52, 893-897 
The CSRB conducted an appellate review of the Step 5 hearing, and held that Moon 
did not commit an "abuse of position". However, the CSRB found that because Moon had 
committed the wildlife violation, that violation alone was sufficient to terminate Moon. It 
is this holding which Moon now attacks as a matter of law.R., 133-55. 
Moon did not shoot the antelope in question, and, at the time, did not even know that 
an infraction had been committed. The facts in this case clearly show that many hunters have 
been unsure as to where Utah ends and Wyoming begins at the very spot Moon's son shot 
the antelope. In fact, citations are often not issued to hunters in that area. The topography of 
this particular area makes it practically impossible for one to know the location of the state 
boundary. R., 872-879. As such, Moon clearly lacked the "culpability, knowledge and 
control" required by the Utah Supreme Court for termination. Indeed, a very similar CSRB 
case came to exactly the same conclusion in an incident more egregious than this one. See, 
Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver. 3 PRB 22 
(1986). 
Furthermore, the penalty of termination requires an investigation into mitigating 
factors, including whether this severe penalty is proportionate to the infraction committed. 
See section III, infra. Such an investigation was not made by the CSRB, at either the 5th or 
3 
6th level. This omission denied Moon of rights protected by Utah regulatory guidelines and 
precedent established by prior case law. In fact, Moon's termination was more severe than 
any punishment handed down in the past by the Department or the CSRB for similar 
infractions. Had the CSRB performed such an investigation, Moon's termination could not 
have been upheld. 
Finally, Moon's participation in the wildlife incident took place while he was off-duty. 
Therefore, before he can be terminated for such conduct, a nexus must be established 
between his off-duty conduct and his ability to perform the tasks required by his position. See 
section IV, infra. No such showing was made by the Department. Nevertheless, the CSRB 
held that Moon's termination was appropriate. This ruling is incorrect as a matter of law. 
For each of these reasons, the Court should overturn Moon's termination. 
Moon should be reinstated, with back pay and benefits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Before taking his position with the Department, Moon had an impressive 
employment record. After receiving a Master's degree in environmental biology, Moon 
earned a Pd.D. in genetics at the University of Hawaii. Moon then worked as genetic section 
manager at Research Park, University of Utah. Later, Moon was hired by Governor 
Matheson as the State Science Advisor. Moon continued in this position for the next 11 
years, until 1993. R., 824-827. 
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2. Moon then transferred to the Department in 1993. From that time until 
January, 1997, Moon had no record of discipline or other employment-related problems.1 
Moon's initial position with the Department was as Assistant Director of Wildlife Resources. 
In 1995, he moved into the position of Fields and Programs Administrator. In total, Moon 
has provided over 15 years of service to the state of Utah, with no disciplinary action taken 
against him. R., 830-833; 15 CSRB/H.O. 218 atp.l. 
3. On December 7, 1996, Moon went with his sons Nathan (19) and Ryan (18) 
on a hunting expedition into Woodruff, a hunting area in northern Utah. Nathan had acquired 
all necessary Utah licenses and tag for the trip, and was the only one actually hunting. Moon, 
who was simply driving his boys, was off duty at the time of this excursion. R. 144, 859-
862. 
4. Later that day, the Moons crossed the border, which had been mismarked, and 
then headed down a dirt road which angled southwest into Utah. Moon wanted to be sure that 
any hunting his son did would be done in Utah territory, so they drove in a direction they 
believed took them deeper into Utah. With no definite markings of any kind to guide them, 
however, it was unclear exactly where one border ended and another began. R., 863-872. 
5. At this time, Moon and his sons noticed a group of antelope running towards 
them. As the antelope crossed the dirt road, Nathan raised his gun and shot at one of the 
Moon's record as State Science Advisor is similarly unblemished. 
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antelope. Moon still believed he was in Utah.2 Moon had checked a Utah map, and the map 
indicated that they were in Utah. R. at 145, 873-876. 
6. The area the Moons were in at this time was very open, while the roads 
followed no definite direction, and no definite landmarks marked the way. As far as Moon 
knew, he and his sons were still in Utah. R., 872-879, 960. 
7. Moon and his sons began driving southwest again, when they saw off to the 
east a fallen antelope. Nathan then got out of the car and went to the antelope to see if it was 
wounded. Moon never left his vehicle. Nathan approached the wounded antelope and killed 
it. Nathan then tagged the antelope with a Utah tag, and brought the antelope back to the car. 
The antelope was then loaded into the vehicle and the Moons returned to their home. At all 
times, Moon still believed that he and his sons were in Utah. R. at 146, 880-890, 962-963. 
8. The following Tuesday, a Wyoming officer came to speak with Moon and his 
son, Nathan. The officer informed Moon that the antelope had been shot in Wyoming, and 
therefore taken without proper tags. Moon cooperated fully with the officer, and ultimately 
paid the fine assessed. Moon received a Wyoming citation for "aiding or assisting" in the 
taking of an antelope in Wyoming in a closed season. Nathan was cited for the taking of the 
antelope. This was the first time that Moon knew he had been in Wyoming. R., 889-893; 15 
CSRB/H.0.218atp.4. 
2
 At no time did Moon engage in any actual hunting. The only person to hunt on this trip 
was Nathan. 
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9. Moon was not terminated by the Department for this incident. Instead, he was 
placed on suspension pending an investigation. Prior to this incident, Moon had never 
received discipline of any kind in the twenty years he worked for the state. Moon's son, on 
the other hand, was immediately terminated from his seasonal position with the Department. 
R. at 146-147, 893-897. 
10. The Department's investigation came up with the charge of "abuse of position", 
for an incident which occurred in October, 1997. R., 350-352. Moon was then terminated 
after this investigation had been completed, for both the wildlife infraction and the "abuse 
of position" charge. R., 147. 
11. Moon appealed this decision to the CSRB. At a Step 5 hearing, Moon's 
termination was upheld on the basis of a "pattern of abuse", namely, the wildlife incident and 
Moon's "abuse of discretion".R., 34-52. 
12. Moon appealed this decision to the Career Service Review Board. At a Step 
6 formal adjudicative preceding, the Board held that Moon did not engage in an abuse of 
position. However, the Board held that the wildlife incident was alone sufficient to merit 
termination. R., 133-55. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Moon fs Participation in a Single Wildlife Incident is Insufficient to Merit Termination. 
The CSRB3 properly found that Moon did "aid and/or counsel in taking antelope 
during a closed season", a Wyoming misdemeanor subject to a fine. R., 150. The CSRB did 
From this point forward, reference to the "CSRB" decision means the Step 6 review. 
7 
not find that this act was intentional, but stated that Moon "knew or should have known" he 
was in Wyoming at the time of the incident. R., 150,153. Moon does not dispute the 
infraction occurred, and in fact cooperated with authorities once he learned of the infraction. 
R., 892-895. However, as a matter of law, this act alone does not merit termination. As the 
only black mark on an otherwise untarnished work record, this sole charge does not warrant 
the sanction imposed. 
This is true for the following reasons. 
I. Prior Case Law Establishes That Termination Was an Excessive Penalty 
It is well established in administrative proceedings that like penalties should be 
imposed for like offenses. Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 949 P.2d 746, 
762 (Utah App. 1997). To this end, the case of Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert 
O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22 (1986), serves as an example to which this 
Court should compare Moonfs conduct. Weaver's actions are similar to, if not more 
egregious than Moon's actions. However, Weaver's termination by the Department was 
overturned by the CSRB. Weaver's reinstatement shows that Moon's termination was 
inappropriate. 
17. Acts of Other Department Officers and Employees Demonstrate a Pattern Within 
the Department: Moon fs Single, Unintentional Wildlife Violation is Insufficient 
to Warrant Termination. Therefore His Termination Was Unfair and Arbitrary. 
Moon introduced to the CSRB numerous examples of similarly situated Department 
employees who were not terminated though they committed violations more egregious than 
that committed by Moon in this case. See, e.g., R. at 79-80. These examples show that 
8 
Moon's termination was improper and unduly severe, as it is disproportionate to the offense, 
and would be inconsistent with the Department's prior practices. 
/ / / . Mitigating Factors and Circumstances Were Ignored in Upholding Moon9s 
Termination. 
Utah case law and regulatory law requires that, before a state employee is terminated, 
the decision-maker will contemplate various mitigating factors. As one CSRB hearing 
officer has put it, there are really two questions involved: first, did the employee commit an 
infraction worthy of termination; and, second, under all the facts and circumstances of the 
case, is it fair to terminate this employee despite his conduct. UDOT v. Thomas V. 
Rasmussen. 2 PRB 19 (1986). The CSRB effectively ignored this second question, 
contributing one sentence of space to "mitigating factors". This is a legally deficient 
analysis, and is also regrettable, since an analysis of mitigating factors in this case would 
have heavily favored Moon. 
IV. The "Nexus" Required by Law for Termination Based on Off-Duty Activities is 
Absent. 
Finally, since Moon's infraction took place while he was off-duty, a showing of nexus 
is required in order uphold a termination based on such conduct. Utah Dept. of Transp. v. . 
824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1997). The CSRB's decision shows no nexus between Moon's 
infraction and his ability to perform his duties as Field and Parks Administrator, and should 
therefore be overturned. 
For each of these reasons, Moon's termination was grossly excessive in proportion to 
the wildlife infraction. Moon should therefore be reinstated with back pay and benefits. 
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ARGUMENT 
Moon's Citation for Aiding and Assisting in Wyoming is Not Sufficient to 
Terminate His Employment 
I. Prior Case Law Establishes That Termination Was an Excessive Penalty. 
Moon was terminated by the Department for his alleged involvement in two unrelated 
incidents. These included his participation in the wildlife incident and an alleged "abuse of 
position". R., 38. When Moon challenged this decision to the CSRB, the CSRB held that 
Moon had not engaged in an "abuse of position". R., 134. However, the CSRB still held that 
Moon's participation in the wildlife incident was alone sufficient to uphold his termination. 
R., 134. Prior CSRB case law belies this holding. The CSRB decision of Division of Parks 
and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D.Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22, establishes that 
termination was an excessive penalty in light of Moon's relatively minor infraction, and that 
Moon did not exhibit the culpability, knowledge and control necessary to justify termination. 
The CSRB held that Moon had engaged in an unlawful hunting activity in Wyoming 
by aiding and assisting his son, Nathan, in the taking of an antelope during a closed season, 
and that this act warranted termination. R., 144-155 This holding was based on the following 
facts: Moon went with his sons on a hunting trip into Northern Utah. His son Nathan was the 
only one who had a permit to hunt. R., 144. The three drove towards the Wyoming border, 
when they spotted an antelope herd. R., 145. Nathan fired once at the running herd. Id. The 
Moons spoke to the driver of a vehicle chasing the vehicle, id., and then spoke to the Chens, 
another couple in the area, who asked Moon, "aren't we in Wyoming?". Moon replied, "yes, 
according to the man in that truck". Id. The Moons then drove in various directions when 
10 
they came upon a fallen antelope. R., 145-146. Nathan got out of their car and shot the 
antelope. R., 146. Ryan and Nathan then tagged the antelope, dragged it to the car, and gutted 
it, burying the gut pile. Id. Moon did not shoot the antelope, or drag or gut the antelope, but 
instructed the boys on how to gut the animal. Id. The Moons then took the antelope home 
with them. Id. 
The CSRB concluded that termination for Moon's participation in this incident alone 
was supported by just cause; that this single act was sufficient to justify the penalty of 
termination. However, this decision flies in the face of prior CSRB case law. 
In a more egregious case, Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson 
and D.Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22, the CSRB examined the propriety of terminating a 
Department official (Weaver) for his participation in an illegal shooting and cutting-up of a 
bear cub. Weaver was a regional manager and a peace officer for the Division of Parks and 
Recreation. Weaver, Robert Anderson (another Department manager), and several 
Department employees were part of an elk hunting party, when Anderson unlawfully shot 
and killed a black bear cub out of season. Id., at pp. 10-11. Weaver was present when 
Anderson killed the bear, but took no part in the shooting. Id. Once the bear had been shot, 
Weaver decided that the bear should be moved. This was later called "concealment" by the 
Department. Id., at pp. 11-12. Weaver then suggested that the men take "souvenirs" from 
the cub, meaning small pieces of the cub itself. Although Weaver did not cut-up the bear 
himself, he was present as the other men - including Anderson - began to do so. Id. Once the 
hunting party returned home, neither Weaver nor Anderson reported the incident. Id. 
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Weaver was accused by the Department of both "malfeasance" and "nonfeasance" in 
office. As a member of management, he was told by the Department that he should have 
been a "leader" in reporting the incident, that he had stood by and watched as the bear was 
torn apart, and then took part in a scheme to "cover up" the incident. Id at p.2. Weaver was 
subsequently terminated by the Department. 
Weaver's termination was overturned by the CSRB, and Weaver was assessed a six-
week penalty, after which he was reinstated with back pay and benefits. Id, at p.27. This 
decision was based largely on a comparison of Weaver's actions with those of Anderson, who 
actually shot and cut-up the bear. Id The CSRB noted that Weaver had watched and, at 
times, directed, but did not participate in the killing of the bear. Id. at pp. 11-12, 27. The 
CSRB therefore upheld the termination of Anderson, but reinstated Weaver, stating that, "[i]t 
is reasonable as well as justifiable that their respective penalties individually manifest that 
difference based upon their degree of culpability." Id., at p. 27. 
"Culpability", as noted by the CSRB, was one of the requirements necessary to satisfy 
the standards for termination for "just cause". Id. The CSRB noted that, according to the 
Utah Supreme Court, "culpability, knowledge and control must be present" in order to 
terminate an employee such as Moon. Id., citing Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 
(Utah 1985). The CSRB held that, while Anderson's actions manifested the degree of 
culpability necessary for termination for cause, Weaver's did not. 
The actions of Moon in this case are less culpable than those committed by Weaver. 
On an off-duty hunting trip, Weaver, a regional manager and a peace officer, watched as 
12 
Anderson illegally shot a bear cub. 3 PRB 22, p. 11-14. On an off-duty hunting trip, Moon, 
a Fields and Programs Administrator, watched from his car as his son shot an antelope. R., 
36, 146. Weaver knew that the killing of the bear cub was illegal. 3 PRB 22, p. 11-14. 
Moon did not know that Nathan's act of shooting was illegal at the time, because he did not 
know he was in Wyoming. R., 44, 149 (employing "knew or should have known" standard), 
872-879. Weaver directed others to move the bear, possibly in an attempt to hide the carcass. 
3 PRB 22, p. 12. Moon did not attempt to cover up the incident as Weaver did; instead, 
when confronted with the fact that he had been in Wyoming, Moon admitted his mistake. R., 
at 37, 889-893. Weaver suggested the other Department employees cut "souvenirs" from the 
bear, in clear violation of the law. 3 PRB 22, p. 12. Moon never told his sons to engage in 
illegal activities, but merely directed them on the appropriate, and - but for the location -
sound hunting procedures. R., 146,149. Weaver's leadership position in the Department, 
influenced subordinates to disregard their duty, under the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. 
3 PRB 22, p. 14. Moon was present only with his sons, and therefore did not influence other 
employees of the Department. Further, Moon did not contest the violation when informed of 
it, and took immediate responsibility for even this inadvertent violation. R.,150, 889-893. 
Finally, Weaver was not terminated, as he was not the one who shot and cut-up the bear. 3 
PRB 22, p. 26-27. Moon was terminated from the Department, although he did not shoot or 
cut the antelope. R., 155. 
The similarities between this case and Anderson and Weaver are obvious. Like the 
comparison between Dennis Weaver and Robert Anderson, Moon's penalty should reflect 
13 
the difference "based on [his] degree of culpability" and the culpability of Nathan (who was 
terminated). 
Such culpability, as well as knowledge and control, are lacking here. Moon submitted 
testimony to the CSRB which showed that no one was very familiar with the particular area 
involved, R., 960; that Moon did not know where the Utah border ended, R., 872-879; that 
many hunters become confused in that area, icL at 1048-1059; that no real landmarks were 
present, and that it is extremely difficult to tell where one state ends and another begins in 
this particular area, kL; and that no one was sure exactly where the men were at the time id 
at 314-315, 880. Therefore, without a showing of culpability, knowledge and control, both 
the facts and law of Anderson and Weaver are applicable to this case, and show that Moon's 
termination should be overturned. 
Moreover, the CSRB's attempt to distinguish Anderson and Weaver is unconvincing. 
The CSRB held that (1) Kehl v. Board of Review. 700 P.2d 1129, did not apply to cases 
outside of the context of unemployment cases , R., 151, and (2) Moon's actions were more 
akin to those of Anderson than Weaver. R., 152-154. These conclusions cannot be supported. 
First, the holding in Kehl was explicitly adopted by the CSRB in the Anderson and 
Weaver decision, and its application to such cases has never been rejected by this Court or 
the Utah Supreme Court. In addition, Utah Administrative Code R 477-11-2 states that, 
"[a]n employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause" By definition this would require 
some form of culpability. See, e.g., Thompson v. Civil Service Commission, 134 P.2d 188, 
14 
194 (Utah 1943)("removal for cause...means inefficiency, incompetency or other kindred 
qualifications"). 
Second, there is no support for the CSRB's finding that Moon's actions were more 
like Anderson's acts than Weaver's in the Anderson and Weaver case. The CSRB found that 
Moon's actions were more than an "idle bystander", and that he was chiefly responsible for 
the unlawful taking of the antelope. R., 152. However, as noted above, Weaver's actions 
were less "idle" than Moon's actions in this case, and were more involved with the actual 
cutting-up and taking of an animal than those of Moon. The CSRB therefore erred in its 
analysis which upheld Moon's termination for this single incident. 
In sum, reference to the Anderson and Weaver decision shows that termination was 
an excessive penalty in light of Moon's relatively minor infraction, and in light of the fact 
that Moon did not exhibit the culpability, knowledge and control necessary to justify 
termination. The CSRB's decision to uphold Moon's termination should therefore be 
reversed. 
II. Acts of Other Department Officers and Employees Demonstrate a Pattern 
Within the Department: Moon's Single, Unintentional Wildlife Violation 
is Insufficient to Warrant Termination. Therefore His Termination Was 
Unfair and Arbitrary. 
An essential factor in a determination of proper punishment is whether the penalty an 
employee receives is proportionate to the offense for which he is punished. To this end, one 
of the requirements imposed upon the CSRB by the Utah Administrative Code is that the 
CSRB assures the "correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes". R. 137-1-
21(D)(3). Correct and consistent application of these policies and rules guarantees that each 
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employee is treated fairly and according to predictable standards. See, Lucas v. Murray City 
Civil Service Commission. 949 P.2d 746, 762 (Utah App. 1997). Consistency of punishment 
not only allows employees to know what is expected and accepted, but also is an element of 
due process afforded each employee. See, Lunnen v. Utah Dept. Of Transp.. 886 P.2d 70, 
73 (Utah App. 1994) ; see also David R. Bytheway v. Utah Dept. Of Pub. Safety. 13 
CSRB/H.O. 191 (1996), at pp. 17,24 ("It is seen as essentially unfair to summarily discipline 
someone - to take away his or her livelihood - without giving the employee prior 
opportunities to conform to the expectations of the employer or to correct a mistake.") 
However, the CSRB failed to follow R. 137-1-21(D)(3) in this case, and denied Moon a 
consistent, proportionate penalty for his infraction when it terminated him for an 
unintentional wildlife violation. 
Moon presented to the CSRB numerous examples of other Department officers and 
employees who had committed various wildlife infractions but had not been terminated for 
such infractions. Moon argued that the fact that these similarly situated individuals were not 
terminated shows that Moon was unfairly treated, and that his infraction did not merit such 
a harsh penalty. However, the CSRB held as follows: 
[W]hen these comparisons are scrutinized, Grievantfs actions: (1> were 
committed by a person in a higher DWR managerial position than the other 
employees, (2) compare unfavorably because many of the other employees 
voluntarily turned themselves in and some even wrote themselves citations, 
and (3) constituted big game poaching in a neighboring state...being subjected 
to Wyoming's judicial punishment - which resulted in disgracing Utah's DWR 
staff in particular, and the division in general. 
R. at 154. 
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While this statement may rationalize treating one or two cases differently than Moon's 
situation, it simply cannot explain away the existence of numerous officers and employees 
within the Department and elsewhere who have all engaged in similar infractions, and who 
have not been terminated. R., 347, 349, 395, 919-924, 1139-1140. In each of these cases, 
it is obvious that the Department had not considered the incidents involved "serious" enough 
to warrant termination. Equally obvious, the infractions involved were no less "egregious" 
than that committed by Moon. 
Wayne Halverson, a Department employee, illegally shot at ravens from a vehicle 
across a forest service road. He did not turn himself in because he did not know it had been 
illegal He was cited and warned, but received probation rather than termination. R., 919-
920. Mike Hutchings, a park ranger, and Ron Hodson, a biologist, were both cited for illegal 
hunting incidents, yet neither were terminated. R., 395. William Bates, a biologist, 
participated in a felony violation by assisting in an illegal sheep hunt. Bates was not 
terminated despite a second incident. Instead, he was merely suspended. R., 923-924. Kent 
Summers, also a Department biologist, unlawfully took two elk. Summers was only fined. 
Dennis Austin, another biologist, took sage grouse in a closed area. Austin was fined $15 
and no other action was taken against him.R., 920-926. 
The pattern, then, is clear: a single wildlife incident does not normally merit 
termination within the Department. Further, termination has been seen as particularly 
inappropriate when, as is the case with Moon, the underlying infraction was committed by 
mistake. The testimony of John Kimball, the man responsible for Moon's termination, makes 
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clear that in the past, the Department has not terminated various employees who have 
committed infractions unintentionally. Kimball testified that Randy Berger, an assistant 
wildlife manager, illegally took an elk in a closed area. However, Kimball stated that Berger 
was not terminated but was reprimanded. R., 346-347. Kimball's explanation was that 
Berger killed the elk by "an honest mistake. He didn't go into it knowing that there was a 
problem." Id Kimball also testified that two unnamed biologists were cited for hunting 
pheasants in a closed area. The biologists were not terminated, because , as Kimball noted, 
they were in a place that they "weren't as familiar with." R., 348-349. 
Moon did not shoot an animal, but was cited for "aiding and assisting". Much like 
the two biologists noted above, Moon was in an area he was unfamiliar with. He did not 
know whether he was in Utah or Wyoming. In short, Moon made "an honest mistake." 
Such acts have not warranted termination by the Department in the past. 
As noted in David R. Bytheway v. Utah Dept. Of Pub. Safety, 13 CSRB/H.O. 191, 
"there are obvious first offenses which should never be tolerated...such as smoking in a 
dynamite factory, embezzlement, or assaulting a supervisor." 13 CSRB/H.O. 191 at 18. 
Otherwise, "it is seen as essentially unfair to summarily discipline someone - to take away 
their livelihood - without giving the employee prior opportunities to conform to the 
expectations of the employer, or to correct a mistake." LI at 17, quoting Redeker, Discipline: 
Policies and Procedures (1984) at p.20. 
Normally, the Department has followed this sound policy, such as in the cases of 
Randy Berger, Dennis Austin, and William Bates; indeed Bates was even retained after a 
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second infraction. R., 923-924. At first, the discipline of Moon seemed to follow this regular 
pattern: when the Department learned of his wildlife infraction, it suspended Moon, but did 
not terminate him. Only after an investigation was made into Moon's background, which 
supposedly uncovered an "abuse of position" charge, was Moon terminated. R.,37-38. 
However, the CSRB concluded that there was no abuse of position. R.,134. Nevertheless, 
the CSRB determined that the wildlife incident alone was sufficient to merit termination. 
R.,134. This defies CSRB precedent, and is belied by the regular pattern of disciplinary 
conduct displayed by the Department.4 Only after Moon commenced an action to fight his 
termination did the Department claim that the wildlife violation was sufficient to terminate 
Moon. At the time of the incident, however, this was not the case.5 
The CSRB has issued a punishment against Moon which is inconsistent from those 
rendered previously. In doing so, the CSRB ignored prior case law, and administered an 
unprecedented punishment, thereby violating Utah Admin. Code. R. 137-1-21(D)(3). This 
decision was therefore arbitrary and incorrectly applied the law, and should be overturned. 
It is also belied by the fact that Nathan was terminated immediately, while Moon's 
termination did not come until the investigation of other "wrongful acts" had been completed. 
Moon's wildlife infraction occurred on or about December 7, 1996. However, Moon 
did not receive a letter from Kimball (stating that Kimball was considering termination) until 
January 30, 1997 - after the "abuse of position" charge had been concocted. Moon was 
terminated a week later. R., 160, 173. 
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III. Mitigating Factors and Circumstances Were Ignored in Upholding 
Moon's Termination. 
As Moon stated in his briefs submitted to the CSRB, both Utah regulations and case 
law require that an analysis of mitigating factors be engaged in before a penalty is imposed 
upon a state employee. Because the CSRB failed to do so, its decision should be overturned. 
The CSRB has its own "mitigating factors rule" at Utah Administrative Code R 137-
1-20(1), which states as follows: 
Past Work Record. In those proceedings where a disciplinary penalty is at 
issue, the past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of 
either mitigating or sustaining the penalty in the event that the employee is 
found guilty of the disciplinary charge alleged. 
Further, a number of reported Utah cases and CSRB cases have recognized the 
requirement of looking into mitigating circumstances. As the Hearing Officer in UDOT v. 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, 2 PRB 19 (1986) explained, there are two questions which should 
be asked in a termination case involving a public employee \ first, did the employee engage 
in an act which, on its own, warrants dismissal; second, "do the relevant facts and 
circumstances...mitigate against termination?" Id. at p. 28. This second question was 
largely ignored by the CSRB. 
In Anderson and Weaver, the Board noted that before a penalty is issued, a hearing 
officer should consider, "the presence of mitigating and/or extenuating circumstances, an 
employee's service record, any disparity of treatment or selective enforcement of the rules, 
the adequacy of forewarning or guidance, the consistency in the application of the rules and 
procedures, the presence of discriminatory or preferential treatment, longevity of 
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employment, and past rules violations." 3 PRB 22 at 5. Utilizing such factors, the Board 
found that Weaver's actions did not merit termination. Id. at 21. 
Other CSRB determinations have entire sections dedicated to mitigating 
circumstances. In Rasmussen, 2 PRB 19, for instance, the Board made three pages of 
findings concerning mitigating circumstances alone, despite the fact that the Board had 
already found that the act complained of, on its own, merited termination. 2 PRB 19 at 28-31. 
Based on these mitigating factors, the Board then reversed the decision to terminate. 
In Trooper Joe C. Bennett v. Utah Highway Patrol. 2 PRB/H.O. 23 (1981), a police 
officer was terminated for misappropriating funds and disobeying orders. The hearing officer 
contributed five pages of independent findings of fact concerning mitigation, and used these 
findings in his decision to set aside the officer's termination. The hearing officer looked at 
various mitigating factors in order to assess whether termination was proper punishment. 
These factors included: (1) the fact that the officer terminated had eleven years of service; 
(2) the fact that the officer's employment record was exemplary; and (3) the fact that the 
officer was held in high esteem by his colleagues. 2 PRB/H.O. 23 at 13,14; 24-29. Due to 
these factors, the hearing officer held that the officer's dismissal would not advance the 
public interest.6 
In Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 949 P.2d 746, this Court 
examined the termination of a police officer for dishonesty in the reporting of a shooting 
It is interesting that the CSRB actually weighed Moon's public status against him (p.20-
21). It should also be noted that the Department has never disputed the fact that, until the incident 
of December 7, 1997, Moon was a respected and valued state employee. 
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incident. The Court noted that, while the officer may have been dishonest, mitigating 
circumstances rendered his termination "so disproportionate under the facts...that it amounted 
to an abuse of discretion". Id. at 762-763. Among such circumstances were the officer's 
exemplary employment record, his twelve years of service without previous problems, the 
fact that others were not terminated for similar incidents, and the fact that the evidence 
against the officer was thin. Id. at 762. Due to the existence of such factors, this Court 
overturned the officer's termination. 
Finally, Utah Administrative Code R 477-1 l-l(3)(e) envisions as many as 9 factors 
to consider as mitigating circumstances when analyzing the propriety of termination of a 
state employee: 
(I) consistent application of rules and standards 
(II) prior knowledge or rules and standards 
(III) severity of the infraction 
(IV) the repeated nature of violations 
(V) prior disciplinary, corrective actions 
(VI) previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions 
(VII) the employee's past work record 
(VIII) the effect on agency operations 
(IX) the potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property. 
Despite the requirements contained in each of these rules and cases, almost no 
attention was given by the CSRB to the assessment of mitigating factors in Moon's case. In 
fact, the sum of such assessment was expressed in one sentence: 
Although Grievant is a 15-year State employee (a mitigating factor), the nature 
of his participation in the antelope incident along with his senior status at 
DWR are so compelling (as aggravating factors), that his dismissal is neither 
excessive, disproportionate nor otherwise constitute (sic) an abuse of 
discretion. 
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R., 154-155. This cursory analysis is woefully inadequate. 
This analysis was also fundamentally unfair to Moon. Had the facts of this case been 
properly analyzed according to each of the factors laid out in U.A.C. R 477-1 l-l(3)(e), it 
would have been clear that these factors measure favorably for Moon. A brief analysis of 
each factor is all that is necessary to demonstrate that this is so. 
I. Consistent application of rules and standards. 
Moon has explained at length in section II of this brief, supra, that his termination was 
not based on the consistent application of any given set of rules or standards. Instead, his 
termination was quite extraordinary, since many employees have committed similar offenses 
without being terminated by the Department. The Department departed from its consistent 
application of punishment when it terminated Moon, a factor that weighs in Moon's favor. 
II. Prior knowledge of rules and standards. 
At the time of the wildlife incident, Moon did not know he was in contravention of 
a rule or regulation. Instead, at all relevant times, Moon thought he was in Utah, and his map 
showed he was in Utah, where his son's hunt would have been legal. R., 872-879. This is 
consistent with the fact that the CSRB could not find that Moon intentionally helped his son 
on an illegal hunt, but only concluded that Moon "knew or should have known" where he 
was, as all hunters should. R., 153. Moon believed he was in compliance with prior the 
applicable rules and standards. 
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III. Severity of the infraction. 
Moon was cited for a misdemeanor under Wyoming law for "aiding and assisting" his 
son in taking an antelope out of season. R, 150. This infraction was extinguished by the 
payment of a fine. Although Moon does not suggest to the Court that this infraction is 
without significance, it certainly pales in comparison to the conduct of other Department 
employees who were not terminated, such as Wayne Halverson, R., 919-920 (illegally shot 
at ravens), Mike Hutchings and Ron Hodson, R., 395 (illegal hunting incidents), William 
Bates, R., 923-924 (assisting in an illegal sheep hunt), Dennis Austin, R., 920-926 (took sage 
grouse in a closed area), and Randy Berger, R. 346-347 (took an elk in a closed area). 
Moon's infraction also pales with Dennis Weaver's conduct, who was reinstated. Originally, 
the Department agreed with this analysis, as it merely suspended Moon for the infraction.R., 
146-147,893-897. 
IV. The repeated nature of violations. 
This infraction was Moon's first in nearly twenty years of employment. R., 830-833. 
V. Prior disciplinary, corrective actions. 
Moon has experienced no prior disciplinary actions of any type in his entire tenure 
with the State of Utah. R., 830-833. 
VI. Previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions. 
Moon was never warned in any fashion concerning his conduct as a state employee. 
There was never any need. R., 830-833. 
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VII. Past work record. 
Moon's work record has been exemplary. After receiving a Master's degree in 
environmental biology, and a Pd.D. in genetics, Moon worked as genetic section manager 
at Research Park, University of Utah. Later, Moon was hired by Governor Matheson as the 
State Science Advisor. Moon continued in that position for the next 11 years, until 1993. R., 
824-827. Moon then transferred to the Department and served as Assistant Director of 
Wildlife Resources until 1995, and then as Fields and Programs Administrator. During that 
time, Moon had no record of discipline. R., 830-833; 15 CSRB/H.O. 218 at p.l. 
VIII. Effect on agency operations. 
The Department has been unable to cite to any discernible impact which Moon's 
infraction had on agency operations. Although the CSRB noted the Department's vague and 
general fears of "embarrassment" and "disrespect", there is no proof of any effect on the 
workings of the Department. R., 152. The CSRB has previously held that such puffing will 
not uphold a termination. See, Jan Wahlquist v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 15 
CSRB/H.O. 220, and section 1(d), infra. 
IX. The potential of the violation for causing damage to persons or property. 
Moon cannot deny that an antelope was killed on December 7, 1997. However, there 
is no threat of future damage to persons or property. This was a single incident. Indeed, the 
Department has not attempted to show that further damage will occur. 
The CSRB never analyzed or answered the second question of the termination 
calculus: do the relevant facts and circumstances mitigate against termination! The total 
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lack of attention to mitigating factors and circumstances provided Moon with an unfair and 
inappropriate punishment for a single incident. If the CSRB had seriously examined such 
factors, Moonfs discharge would have been overturned. Because this omission ignored both 
Utah regulatory law and case law, the decision of the CSRB should be overturned. 
IV. The "Nexus" Requirement Required by Law for Termination Based on 
Off-Duty Activities is Absent. 
One matter which was barely addressed (if at all) by the CSRB was the fact that 
Moon's wildlife infraction occurred while he was off-duty. Moon was not on official 
business when his son shot the antelope; instead, Moon was with his sons on a hunting trip. 
Therefore, before Moon can be terminated for an infraction which occurred during this trip, 
the Department must show a sufficient "nexus" between Moon's off-duty conduct and his 
ability to perform his duties as an officer of the Department. Utah Dept. of Corrections v. 
Despain. 824 P.2d 439, 446 (Utah 1991). This showing was insufficient as a matter of law. 
Under Utah law, the Department had the burden of proving a nexus between an 
employee's off-duty conduct and his public employment. Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah App. 1991). Proving a nexus requires a showing that off 
duty conduct "cast[s] significant doubt upon his ability to perform his job." Utah Dept. of 
Corrections v. Despain. 824 P.2d 439,446, quoting Dexter v. Idaho Falls Citv Police Dept.. 
742 P.2d 434 (Idaho App. 1987). Mere conclusory statements that the employee's off-duty 
conduct is inimical to the interests of the Department are not sufficient to meet that burden. 
Tolman.. 818 P.2d at 31, n. 7. 
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In its brief to the CSRB, the Department alleged that a nexus did exist between 
Moon's conduct in Wyoming and his various positions with the Department. R. 104-107. 
However, the Department provides no proof that such nexus actually existed, particularly 
between Moon's conduct and his position at that time, Programs and Fields Administrator 
("PFA"). Instead, the Department states that, "there is a significant and legitimate concern 
for Agency as to what it's top management level does", R., 105, and that Moon did not fulfill 
the "mission" of the Department. R., 104. This is not sufficient to show the required nexus 
between Moon's off-duty conduct and his position with the Department. In Jan Wahlquist 
v. Utah Dept. of Corrections. 15 CSRB/H.0.220, a director of the Department of Corrections 
testified that an employee's violation was a "serious policy violation", that such violations 
"might" cause problems with other employees and their fitness for duty. The Step 5 hearing 
officer did not accept such general commentary: 
"these broad policy statements and conclusions do not, in my opinion, 
constitute substantial evidence [for termination]...if that were the case, any 
violation of policy could easily be characterized as a serious violation meriting 
termination...any violation of any policy could be characterized as serious in 
that it indicates that an employee "might act inappropriately on the job or put 
other...in jeopardy" to justify termination...Substantial evidence requires a 
more fact intensive analysis. 
Id. at p.21. The same is true here; despite vague and broad allegations that Moon's conduct 
would have a serious impact on the Department, there was no proof that Moon was unable 
to carry forth with his obligations as PFA, nor his abilities to perform his duties as PFA. 
Nevertheless, the CSRB stated: 
During his term as an assistant or deputy DWR director, Grievant had assigned 
to him responsibility for the Law Enforcement Section of DWR. In that 
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capacity Randy Moon was the manager over those DWR staff who held sworn 
peace officer status. These are the people, who like Conservation Officer Jim 
Gregory, enforce Utah's hunting laws and had the duty to curtail or prevent 
illegal hunting activities. Randy Moon knew or should have known that he 
may not become involved with the illegal killing of an antelope within 
Wyoming's borders. 
R. at 153. This is as close as the CSRB comes to discussing the requirement of nexus. 
However, this discussion is both legally and factually deficient. At the time of the incident, 
Moon was neither a manager of the Law Enforcement Section nor a peace officer. Instead 
Moon was Fields and Programs Administrator. Therefore, the CSRB does not even address 
the nexus between Moon's position and his off-dut^ conduct. 
The CSRB neglects to show a link between Moon's conduct and his "ability to 
perform his job duties". Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439,446. Moon was 
not a peace officer or correctional officer at the time of the wildlife incident. Although Moon 
has repeated this fact a number of times throughout this litigation, the Department has 
continuously tried to impose upon Moon the nexus test which deals specifically with such 
peace officers. However, the "nexus" test necessarily differs depending on the particular 
employee under scrutiny. In the case of a peace officer, for example, scrutiny is higher, as 
that employee's off-duty conduct must reflect, "a level of behavior that is, at all times, worthy 
of public confidence and reflective of their ability, when on the job, to . . . react in a 
reasonable manner to difficult situations." Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain. 824 P.2d 
4395 446. However, for other employees, the "nexus" test does not reach so far. Instead, the 
test requires that the off-duty activity significantly affect the employee's ability to perform 
his particular job. For instance, in Kent v. Dept. of Employment Security. 860 P.2d 984,988 
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(Utah App. 1993), this Court found that a fiduciary owed duties of honesty and trust to his 
employer, and that a nexus was found between the employee's forgery and these duties. In 
Thompson v. Civil Service Commission, 134 P.2d 188, the Commission wanted to remove 
the city fire chief because the mayor was opposed to the chief drinking while off-duty. 
However, the Court noted that the Commission could not penalize the chief for failing to 
"conform to their personal standards", and held that the chief had not been terminated "for 
cause". Id. at 195. In Blaine v. Moffat Ctv. School D. Re No. 1. 748 P.2d 1280, 1292-93 
(Colo. 1987), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a teacher could be fired only for those 
actions which showed an inability to teach. Accordingly, the nexus test will differ depending 
on the acts involved and the position of the actor. 
Moon was charged with a misdemeanor, to wit, aiding and assisting his son in the 
unlawful taking of an antelope out of season - an infraction incurred in Wyoming. R., 150-
151. In order to fulfill the nexus requirement, it must be shown that this infraction somehow 
adversely affected his ability to perform his job. No such showing was made by the 
Department. Instead, as noted supra, the Department quoted broad policy statements and 
conclusions that Moon's actions brought it "embarrassment" and "disrespect", which was 
accepted wholesale by the CSRB. R., 152. This is error, as the CSRB should have required 
"a more fact intensive analysis". Therefore, just as in Jan Wahlquist v. Utah Dept. of 
Corrections, the Court should reject the CSRB's holding that Moon's conduct merits 
termination, as there is no showing of (nor any real discussion about) nexus. 
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Moon made a good-faith error as to where, exactly, he was on December 7, 1996. 
When he was informed of his error, he made no denials, cooperated with authorities, and paid 
a fine. R., 889-893. The Department and the CSRB have failed to show how such conduct 
affected Moon's position as Field and Programs Administrator. Without this showing of 
nexus, the Department cannot terminate Moon for off-duty conduct. Therefore, the CSRB's 
decision should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Moon's actions do not merit termination. Moon's wildlife violation lacks the 
culpability required by prior CSRB and Utah case law for termination for cause. While Moon 
may have made a mistake, this mistake does not deserve the drastic penalty of dismissal. 
This penalty is simply not proportionate to the offense, as evidenced by the fact that 
termination has not been considered appropriate for this type of conduct for other employees 
and officers, including Dennis Weaver. Further, this penalty has been handed down without 
any regard for mitigating circumstances, or the fact that Moon was off-duty at the time of the 
incident. 
Moon is entitled one reasonable mistake during a period of over fifteen years of loyal 
and reputable service without being terminated for it. Moon therefore urges the Court to 
overrule the CSRB's decision to uphold Moon's termination. 
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